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Abstract
Quantum key distribution is widely thought to offer unconditional security
in communication between two users. Unfortunately, a widely accepted proof
of its security in the presence of source, device and channel noises has been
missing. This long-standing problem is solved here by showing that, given
fault-tolerant quantum computers, quantum key distribution over an arbi-
trarily long distance of a realistic noisy channel can be made unconditionally
secure. The proof is reduced from a noisy quantum scheme to a noiseless
quantum scheme and then from a noiseless quantum scheme to a noiseless
classical scheme, which can then be tackled by classical probability theory.
∗This reprint version contains the same material as the one published in Science
283, 2050–2056 (1999). We also include the refereed supplementary notes (as in
http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl) explicitly in the appendix for easy
reference.
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The art of secure communication — cryptography — has a long history. Before two
parties can communicate securely, they often must share a secret random string of numbers
(a key) for encryption and decryption. The secrecy of the message depends on the secrecy of
the key. A problem in conventional cryptography is the key distribution problem: In classical
physics, there is nothing to prevent an eavesdropper from monitoring the key distribution
channel passively, without being caught by the legitimate users.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) (1-5) has been proposed as a solution to the problem.
The quantum no-cloning theorem states that it is impossible to make an exact copy of an
unknown quantum state (6). Thus, it is generally thought that eavesdropping on a quantum
channel will almost surely produce detectable disturbances. The two users can, therefore,
use part of their quantum signals to test for eavesdropping. Only when the error rates
are acceptable will they use the quantum signals to generate a key. Thus, the two users
(commonly called Alice and Bob) have the confidence that if an eavesdropper (commonly
called Eve) has a nonnegligible amount of information on the final key, she will almost surely
be caught, even if she has infinite computing power and access to a quantum computer.
Incidentally, several recent experiments have demonstrated the feasibility of QKD over tens
of kilometers (7).
“The most important question in quantum cryptography is to determine how secure it
really is ” (8, p.16). QKD is widely claimed to provide perfect security. However, this
viewpoint has been under renewed scrutiny for two reasons. First, contrary to well-known
claims of unconditional security (9), a class of other quantum cryptographic schemes, in-
cluding so-called quantum bit commitment and quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer,
has recently been shown to be insecure (10) . Cheaters can defeat these schemes by a
subtle application of the well-known Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox (11) and by
delaying their measurements. These “no-go” theorems not only shattered the long-standing
belief in the security of those schemes, but they also undermined the confidence in QKD
itself. Second, a convincing and rigorous proof of the security of QKD has been missing
despite extensive investigations (12-15). Thus, the foundation of quantum cryptography
has been shaky. Here, we solve this long-standing problem by proving that, given quantum
computers, QKD can be made unconditionally secure over arbitrarily long distances.
A rigorous proof of the security of a QKD scheme requires the explicit construction of
a procedure such that, whenever Eve’s strategy has a nonnegligible probability of passing
the verification test by Alice and Bob, her information on the final key will be exponentially
small (16-17). This procedure must be secure and efficient, even when Alice and Bob use
imperfect sources and devices and share a noisy quantum channel.
Most analyses on the security of QKD have dealt with single-particle eavesdropping
strategies (12), with immediate or delayed measurements, as well as the so-called collective
attacks (13), in which Eve brings each signal particle into interaction with a separate probe
system but then, after hearing the public discussion between Alice and Bob, measures all
probes together. Security against the most general type of attack, the so-called joint attack,
has been investigated by Deutsch et al. and also by Mayers. The discussion by Deutsch et
al. was restricted to the special case of perfect devices (14). It introduced the concept of
quantum privacy amplification, based on a process called entanglement purification, which
was studied by Bennett, DiVincenzo, Smolin and Wootters (BDSW) (18). Earlier versions
of Mayers’ proof (15) have not been accepted as definitive. His most recent version of the
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proof is more detailed and complex (19). He proposes a proof of security of the Bennett and
Brassard (BB84) (2) scheme against joint attacks in the presence of detector and channel
noise but with an ideal trusted single-photon source. Our current work and work by Mayers
(19) are contemporaneous and independent. They differ greatly in their premises, methods
and consequences: (i) Mayers’ work deals with the standard BB84 QKD protocol (2) for
preparation, transmission, and measurements of nonorthogonal states. His approach does
not require Alice and Bob to have a quantum computer, although Eve may have one. In
contrast, our proof applies to a new QKD protocol, involving fault-tolerant sharing and pu-
rification of so-called EPR pairs, and requires that Alice and Bob have quantum computers.
(ii) Mayers’ work (19) assumes an ideal single-photon or EPR-pair source, thus disallowing
a beam-splitter attack. [A testing procedure for an allegedly ideal EPR-pair source from
an untrusted vendor has recently been suggested by Mayers and Yao (20).] In contrast, our
work allows the reception of untrusted imperfect quantum signals from the channel (21). (iii)
Our proof and protocol allow QKD to be securely extended over arbitrarily large distances
through a chain of insecure relay stations. A similar extension of BB84 in Mayers’ proposed
proof would require secure relay stations, to which Eve does not have access. (iv) Our proof
is conceptually simpler. (v) Our techniques have widespread applications outside QKD.
Why is a proof of security of QKD so difficult? In a joint attack, Eve treats the whole
sequence of quantum signals as a single entity. She couples this entity with her probe and
then unitarily evolves the combined system. She forwards a subsystem to Bob and keeps the
remaining subsystem for eavesdropping purposes. Eve can use any unitary transformation
she likes, and yet, a secure QKD scheme must defeat all of them. Moreover, Eve may attempt
to mask her presence by attributing the errors caused by her eavesdropping attack to normal
transmission noise. Furthermore, because the particles are now generally entangled with each
other, a naive application of classical probability theory may lead to fallacies [See the EPR
paradox (11)].
Despite these apparent difficulties, we show that it is possible to distinguish a malicious
Eve from noise. Moreover, it is possible to use classical probability theory to establish the
security of QKD.
Techniques and importance of results. Assuming that users have access to quantum
computers, we show the security of QKD by a reduction in two steps. The central theme
of the first step is to reduce the noisy quantum scheme (imperfect devices, noisy channels,
storage errors, and so forth) to a noiseless quantum scheme. We do this by combining
the ideas of “quantum repeaters” (22,23) and fault-tolerant quantum computation (FTQC)
(24,25). Although these are existing ideas in the field, we make the nontrivial observation
that they can be combined and applied to QKD to distinguish noise from a malicious Eve.
In particular, we note that knowing the error syndrome does not help an eavesdropper.
Therefore, we can give an eavesdropper full control of the quantum repeater stations without
compromising security.
Even in a noiseless quantum scheme, Alice and Bob are required to verify that the
particles are untampered by Eve. Things will be easy if one can apply classical arguments
to solve this quantum problem at hand. However, as illustrated by the EPR paradox, naive
classical arguments often lead to fallacies. The most important technical contribution of
this paper is our second theme — reducing the noiseless quantum verification scheme to
a classical one. Finally, we establish the security of the classical verification scheme by
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classical probability theory. The security of the quantum scheme then follows.
The use of classical arguments in our quantum problem allows us to simplify our discus-
sion greatly. We emphasize that the validity of this usage is highly paradoxical. Classical
arguments work in our quantum problem because all the observables Oi’s under consid-
eration are diagonal with respect to a single basis B. In more detail, let us consider the
observable M , which represents a complete von Neumann measurement along the same
basis B. Because all of the Oi’s under consideration are diagonal with respect to B, M com-
mutes with all the observables Oi’s. Therefore, the measurement M along basis B will in
no way change the outcome of the subsequent Oi’s. Without any loss of generality, one can
imagine that such a complete von Neumann measurement M is always performed before the
measurement of subsequent Oi’s. In other words, the initial state of the quantum system is
simply a classical mixture of eigenstates of M , and hence, classical arguments carry over to
the quantum case. We remark that the Oi’s that we consider are coarse-grained observables
(observables with degenerate eigenvalues) rather than fine-grained observables (observables
with nondegenerate eigenvalues).
Quantum-computational protocols. The execution of our secure QKD scheme re-
quires large-scale quantum computers for both error correction and verification. Building
such computers is a technological feat that is far beyond our current technology. However,
all existing QKD security analyses require some idealization also. In an actual experimen-
tal implementation of polarization-coding BB84 (a standard “prepare-and-measure” P/M
scheme) over a substantial distance (say 40km) of a lossy quantum channel using coherent
states, Eve may, in principle, break the system completely by a generalized beam-splitting
attack (26). This is so even when the bit error rate of the quantum signals is strictly zero.
Quantum-computational protocols like ours are worthy of analysis for several reasons.
First, unlike the usual P/M schemes, they extend the range of secure QKD to arbitrarily
long distances even with insecure quantum repeaters. Second, when implemented over a
noisy channel without repeaters, it is conceivable that they can tolerate a higher noise level
than a standard P/M scheme. Third, a proof of security and the tradeoff between noise
and key rate are much easier than those for P/M schemes. Indeed, our scheme provides a
conceptually simple and rigorous proof of the security of QKD without the full complexity
of a P/M scheme.
EPR pairs. Before we report our QKD scheme in detail, let us first recapitulate the
usefulness of an EPR pair, that is, a singlet state 1√
2
(| ↑↓〉 − | ↓↑〉) of a pair of quantum
bits (qubits) (27) in QKD. If two members of an EPR pair are measured along any common
axis, each member will give a random outcome, and yet, the outcomes of the two members
will always be antiparallel. This spooky action at a distance defies any simple classical
explanation and is at the core of EPR paradox (11).
Now, suppose two distant users share R EPR pairs. Then, the random outcome of
measurement along a common axis generates an R-bit key between them. The laws of
quantum physics assure that the key is truly random and that Eve cannot have any in-
formation on its value. Indeed, the two lemmas in supplementary material (available
at www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl ) [that is, Supplementary Note 2 in this
reprint version] show that, to generate an almost perfectly secure R-bit key, Alice and Bob
only need to share R EPR pairs of almost perfect fidelity (28). Therefore, all we need for
secure QKD is a way for Alice and Bob to share EPR pairs and to verify that, indeed, they
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are EPR pairs. We focus on these EPR distribution and verification problems. There are
two issues that Alice and Bob have to address: noise and Eve.
Reduction to a noiseless scheme. One can classify errors in an EPR-pair distribution
process into four types. First, the quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob
is generally noisy. Second, the EPR source may be imperfect in itself. Third, errors may
occur during the storage of quantum information. Fourth, errors may also occur during
computation; because elementary gates and measuring devices for quantum computation
are generally imperfect, gate errors and measurement errors may arise.
The last three types of errors can be fixed by recently developed quantum error correction
(29) and fault-tolerant quantum computation (FTQC) (24,25) techniques. In particular,
there is a “threshold result” in FTQC: Assuming an independent noise model and that the
error rates for each primitive computational gate and for each time step of storage are smaller
than some positive threshold values, one can perform arbitrarily long quantum computations
with an arbitrarily high fidelity (25). The essence of FTQC is to defeat errors by encoding
quantum states in quantum error-correcting codes (QECC) and then performing quantum
computation on the encoded states.
Quantum repeaters. We must consider the first type of noise — channel noise. If
the quantum communication channel is very noisy (for example, it is very long), we cannot
apply the threshold result in FTQC to combat quantum communication errors. Fortunately,
the idea of quantum repeaters has been proposed as a much more efficient way of correcting
quantum communication errors (23). The idea is summarized as follows .
Given impure EPR pairs shared between two distant observers, they can apply local
operations and classical communication to distill a smaller number of higher fidelity EPR
pairs in a procedure known as entanglement purification (18). However, for distances much
longer than the coherence length of a noisy quantum communication channel, the probability
that a quantum state will remain error-free is exponentially small. Therefore, the fidelity of
transmission is so low that standard purification methods are not applicable.
Quantum repeaters are essentially simple quantum computers installed throughout a
quantum communication channel. They are used to divide the channel into shorter seg-
ments, which are then purified separately, before they are connected. The number and
locations of quantum repeaters are chosen so that it is possible to create EPR pairs with
sufficiently high fidelity between the two ends of each segment. After creating EPR pairs
that are shared between the two ends, one applies entanglement purification by using quan-
tum repeaters. This will, at the cost of discarding some pairs, increase the fidelity of the
remaining pairs. Afterwards, EPR pairs shared between various segments are connected
together by “quantum teleportation” (30). Indeed, a highly efficient procedure involving a
sequence of entanglement purification and teleportation has been devised that allows the
reliable sharing of EPR pairs between two arbitrarily distant locations (23).
Three important remarks are in order. First, with two-way classical communication,
quantum repeaters can greatly improve the yield of distillation (18,23) over the standard
fault-tolerant circuits. Second, even highly imperfect quantum repeaters can do the job very
well: It has been argued (23) that an error rate in the percent level is readily tolerable. Third,
a strength of our approach is that, assuming perfectly reliable local quantum operations by
Alice and Bob, one can actually calculate the threshold value for tolerable noise between
two adjacent quantum repeaters. For example, in the case of a depolarizing channel, it is
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known that a fidelity of 1/2 is the threshold value (18).
With quantum repeaters and FTQC, the usual threshold result can be extended to
distributed quantum computation over a realistic noisy quantum channel (31). In other
words, any distributed quantum algorithm, including the EPR-pairs distribution process,
that works in the noiseless case can always be extended to the noisy case.
Error syndrome contains no useful information for an eavesdropper. We make
the most generous assumption that Eve completely controls the quantum repeaters and
the quantum communication channel. Alice and Bob need only trust their own quantum
computers and authenticated classical messages from each other. There is a subtlety for us to
address. If Eve follows the correct procedure, she will not be caught. However, she does learn
about the error syndrome (that is, the pattern of measurement results) generated during a
FTQC, which allows the error-correction apparatus to correct a corrupted state to a former
value. So, the question is Can the error syndrome tell her anything useful about the state?
The answer is“no” because of the following. Mathematically, each of Alice and Bob’s state
can be written as a tensor product of the logical qubits (which actually contain the quantum
information) and the ancillary qubits (which contain the error syndromes) (32); that is, the
wave function |Ψ〉 can be written as ∑i,j cij |ai〉L ⊗ |ej〉A, where subscripts L, A, i and j
represent the logical qubits, the ancillary qubits, the logical state (in some orthonormal
basis), and the error syndrome, respectively, and cij’s are some complex coefficients. (In
reality, Alice and Bob’s system is generally entangled with Eve’s probe. However, this does
not change the essential point of our argument.) Because of FTQC, although the state of
the ancillary qubits evolves unpredictably over time, the state of the logical qubits will, with
a very high fidelity [1 − O(e−ℓ) for some arbitrarily chosen ℓ > 0 (33)], follow the desired
computation and remain unaffected by the errors. As long as the gate error rate and storage
error rate are sufficiently small, the subsequent verification and key generation steps can be
thought of as being performed solely on the logical qubits. In other words, the ancillary
qubits decouple from the verification step. Accordingly, we shall ignore the ancillary qubits
and focus only on the logical qubits.
If there is no appreciable eavesdropping, the logical qubits will represent the desired state.
Of course, an honest Eve can learn as much as she likes about the error syndrome. The
general theory of QECC tells us that the error syndrome contains absolutely no information
about the encoded quantum state (29).
In summary, we have reduced the proof of security of our noisy QKD (or EPR delivery)
scheme to that of a noiseless one. Now, we focus on the noiseless scheme.
The goal of verification. To make sure that there is no substantial eavesdropping,
Alice and Bob must verify that the state of the logical qubits is, indeed, that of N EPR pairs.
Without any loss of generality, we can allow Eve to not merely act on the N EPR pairs while
they are being shared but to actually prepare them in an arbitrary state of her choosing and
then give them to Alice and Bob (14). She claims that they are perfect EPR pairs. Alice
and Bob will be happy to sacrifice a small number m of those pairs to verify Eve’s claim.
If any one of the m tested pairs fails the test, then all the N pairs are discarded. However,
if all the m pairs pass the test, the remaining N −m pairs will be accepted as singlets and
used to generate the key. The goal of the verification is for Alice and Bob to make sure that
Eve has a very small probability of cheating successfully. By cheating successfully, we mean
that the m tested pairs pass the verification test and yet the remaining N−m pairs, if given
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a yes or no test of being N −m singlets, will give “no” as an answer (34).
The security of our quantum verification scheme will automatically guarantee the security
of the corresponding QKD scheme [refer to (28) for an explicit bound on Eve’s information].
We will now consider the security of our quantum verification scheme.
Essentially, what Alice and Bob are trying to do is to distinguish singlets from triplets.
Although there is no way for Alice and Bob to do so with certainty using only local operations
and classical communication, they can do so with a very high probability.
The goal of a quantum verification scheme is to verify that the state of the N pairs is,
in fact, N singlet. A direct testing of a random subset of EPR pairs requires an exponential
amount of resources in term of the security parameter k, where the probability for Eve to
cheat successfully is, at most, e−k. Direct testing of a random subset is, therefore, not an
efficient verification scheme. To understand this point, suppose Eve cheats by inserting a
single nonsinglet among the N pairs and only m random pairs are tested by Alice and Bob.
There is a probability N−m
N
for this nonsinglet to remain untested. Consequently, Eve has
at least a probability N−m
N
of cheating successfully. To prevent this from happening, it is
necessary for m to be of order N . Even when m equals N − 1, the probability for Eve to
cheat successfully is still at least 1/N . For this to be exponentially small in k, the number
of photons transmitted N , must be exponentially large in k.
A much more efficient way of verifying a quantum state exists. It is due to the random-
hashing idea by BDSW (18). (BDSW proposed it for error correction, but here we use it
for verification.) It is in the same spirit of a classical random-hashing scheme which we will
now describe.
A classical verification scheme. Imagine a game in which Eve locks an N -bit string
x in a box and Alice and Bob are allowed to ask a small number m < N of “fair” questions
about it, which Eve must answer truthfully. A fair question is a yes or no question whose
answer is ”yes” for exactly half of all N -bit strings. Thus, Is the first bit 1? and Are the
first and third bits equal? are fair questions, but Are all the bits 1’s? is unfair. If all of
Eve’s answers are consistent with the assumption that the string x is all 1’s, Alice and Bob
must “accept” the string. Otherwise, Alice and Bob must “reject” the string. Finally, Eve
opens the box and shows Alice and Bob the string to prove that she has answered faithfully.
Eve wins if the string is not all 1’s and yet Alice and Bob have accepted the string. [Alice
and Bob win if the string is not all 1’s and they have rejected the string. If the string is, in
fact, all 1’s, the game is a draw.]
If Alice and Bob ask only single-digit questions of the form Is the kth bit a 1? then Eve
has a good chance of winning by choosing a string with a single 0 at a random location.
However, if Alice and Bob instead ask Eve about the parities of random subsets of the bits,
they quite likely catch any string that is not all 1s.
For example, if the unknown string is x = 1101 and Alice and Bob choose a subset
consisting of the second and third bits (this can be represented conveniently by an index
string s = 0110), the parity x · s is 1. This test reveals that x is not all 1’s, since an all-1’s
four-bit string would have had parity 0 on this subset. More generally, the parity of a subset
s of the bits in a string x is the inner product, or modulo-2 sum of the bit-wise AND of
strings x and s, and it is denoted by x ·s. [In this example, x ·s = 1 ·0+1 ·1+0 ·1+1 ·0 = 1
(mod 2).] The probability that two different strings give the same answer for m iterations of
random parity check is no more than 2−m (18). Thus, by checking only a few subset parities
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(say 20), Alice and Bob can reduce their chance of accepting an x that is not all 1s to less
than one in a million.
Eve must not know the index strings beforehand. Otherwise, she could always cheat
successfully, in a similar way as a smuggler who knows beforehand which of the several bags
a customs inspector will open in an airport. Indeed, because the string has N bits and
there are only m constraints (generated by m rounds of parity verification), there are clearly
exponentially many ( namely, 2N−m), strings that will pass the test. However, because
Eve does not know the index strings beforehand and because the index strings are chosen
randomly, Eve effectively has to put her bet on a single string without prior knowledge.
We see from the last paragraph that any string x 6= 11 · · ·1 chosen by Eve has only an
exponentially small probability (2−m) of passing the verification test.
Our quantum verification scheme. Now, we construct an efficient quantum verifica-
tion scheme that is similar to the classical verification scheme that we have just described.
Consider the so-called Bell basis, Ψ± and Φ±, where
Ψ± =
1√
2
(| ↑↓〉 ± | ↓↑〉) (1)
and
Φ± =
1√
2
(| ↑↑〉 ± | ↓↓〉). (2)
With the convention in (18), Bell basis vectors are represented by two classical bits
Φ+ = 0˜0˜,
Ψ+ = 0˜1˜,
Φ− = 1˜0˜,
Ψ− = 1˜1˜. (3)
(Because Bell basis vectors are maximally entangled, one should never think of them as
direct product states.) A complete basis for N -ordered pairs of qubits (what we shall call
N -bell basis) consists of products of Bell basis vectors, each of which is described by a 2N -
bit string. In the absence of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob share N singlets, whose state
is described by a 2N -bit string of 1˜’s, |1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉.
What happens when there is an eavesdropper? Recall that we allow Eve to not merely act
on the N EPR pairs while they are being shared, but to actually prepare them in an arbitrary
state of her choosing and then give them to Alice and Bob. The pairs may be entangled
among themselves as well as with a probe in Eve’s hands (14). A system described by any
mixed state can be equivalently described by a pure state of a larger system consisting of the
original system and an ancilla (10,14). As discussed by Deutsch et al. (14), by considering
the larger system instead, we shall, without a loss of generality, consider that Eve prepares
a pure state
|u〉 = ∑
i1,i2,···,iN
∑
j
αi1,i2,···,iN ,j|i1, i2, · · · , iN 〉 ⊗ |j〉, (4)
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where ik denotes the state of the kth pair, which runs from 0˜0˜ to 1˜1˜, αi1,i2,···,iN ,j’s are some
complex coefficients, and the |j〉 values form an orthonormal basis for the ancilla. Each state
|u〉 represents a particular cheating strategy chosen by Eve.
The goal of a quantum verification scheme is to verify that the string describing the
state of the N pairs is, in fact, all 1˜’s. We now construct an efficient quantum verification
scheme based on the quantum random-hashing idea by BDSW (18). BDSW showed that
one can compute the parity of any subset of the 2N -bit string by using local operations and
classical communication only (35). The parity is “collected” into a single destination pair; it
is determined by the outcomes of measurements performed on that pair, which has to be dis-
carded afterward. More specifically, the parity is found by noting whether the measurement
outcomes on the two members of the destination pair are parallel or antiparallel.
If Eve prepares a classical mixture of products of Bell states, it is not too difficult to
show that classical arguments apply directly to the quantum verification problem and Eve’s
probability of cheating successfully is negligible [see (36) for details].
Why do classical arguments work for a quantum problem? However, instead of
preparing a classical mixture of products of Bell states, in the most general eavesdropping
strategy as shown in Eq.4, Eve prepares a general state, which is entangled with her probe.
The big question is Can Eve prepare a more general state to enhance her probability of
cheating successfully? The crux of our paper is the following claim: If Eve prepares a
general state to cheat in the BDSW random-hashing verification scheme, her probability
of cheating successfully will be exactly the same as in the situation when she premeasures
that state along the N -Bell basis before handing it over to Alice and Bob. In other words,
a general state offers no advantage over a mixture of products of Bell states. With this
quantum to classical reduction result, (36) applies to any eavesdropping strategy. This
proves that Eve’s probability of cheating successfully is negligible and our QKD scheme is
secure against all possible attacks.
Proof of our claim. Consider the following observables on a state |u〉 of N pairs of
qubits shared between Alice and Bob. We define these observables by their actions on the
22N N -Bell states, which form a complete basis. Let W , defined by W |w〉 = w|w〉, be the
observable that gives the 2N -bit string representing the state w in BDSW notation. For any
index string s, let Qs, defined by Qs|w〉 = (s ·w)|w〉, be the observable that gives the parity
of the subset s of the bits. Finally, let R = |1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉〈1˜1˜ · · · 1˜| be the projector onto a state
of N singlets. All the above operators refer to a single basis (namely, the N -Bell basis).
Because all the observables (R, W and Qs) are simultaneously diagonalizable with respect
to the N -Bell basis, R and all the Qs values commute with W . Therefore, neither the value
of R nor any of the Qs values are affected by a prior measurement of W . In other words, for
any state |u〉 that Eve might have supplied, neither the sequence of subset parities measured
in the verification stage nor the result of the final hypothetical measurement of R would have
been affected if Eve had pre-measured |u〉 in Bell basis (that is, made a measurement of W )
before handing the state to Alice and Bob. Incidentally, the fact that a premeasurement
does not change the outcomes of some subsequent measurements is highly reminiscent of
work by Griffiths and Niu (37).
Subtleties in our proof. The following example illustrates the computation of parities
and the subtleties involved. Suppose Alice and Bob share three pairs of qubits. With the
procedure specified in BDSW, the computation of the parity of the first subset (for example,
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s1 = 001101) can be done by the circuit diagram shown in Fig. 1A. The parity is collected
into a single pair and is determined by whether that pair gives a parallel or antiparallel
outcome when both members are measured along the z axis.
The computation itself, up to phases, performs a permutation on the space of all 2N -
bit strings. After the computation, the measured pair is dropped from consideration, and
only two pairs remain. The computation of the parity of the second subset (for example,
s2 = 1001) by the BDSW procedure is shown in Fig. 1B. After the computation, another
pair is measured and dropped from consideration. Therefore, only a single pair out of the
original three is left after the computation of the two parities (for s1 and s2). A simple
unitary description (10) of the overall computation is that it maps, up to phases, the state
|1˜1˜1˜1˜1˜1˜〉 to |1˜0˜1˜1˜1˜1˜〉. Suppose also that, on passing the verification test, Alice and Bob
generate their secret key by measuring the remaining pair along the z axis, with an “up”
for Alice’s result meaning “0” and a “down” meaning “1”.
A number of subtleties deserve careful discussions. First, as in the classical case, the
choice of subsets can be announced only after Alice and Bob receive all of their quan-
tum particles. So long as Eve does not know the subsets beforehand, her probability of
cheating successfully is exponentially small (see supplementary material, available at www.
sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl) [that is, Supplementary Note 4 in this reprint ver-
sion].
Second, during the computation of the parities of subsets, the state of the N pairs of
qubits is transformed by a unitary transformation Us1,s2,···,sm, which depends on the subsets
si. But would that unitary transformation Us1,s2,···,sm somehow spoil our reduction argument
from a quantum to classical verification? Fortunately, the answer is “no”. Despite the
apparent complexity of the parity computation procedure, the bottom-line answer that Alice
and Bob obtain is simply the parities (that is, the eigenvalues of the operators Qs’s of their
choice). Therefore, the verification test proves that, for any general cheating strategy by Eve
that passes the test with a probability of at least 2−r, the conditional fidelity of the state
before the parity computation as N singlets, |1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉, is 1−O(2−(m−r)). Consequently, the
state after the parity computation will, with the same fidelity, be Us1,s2,···,sm|1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉.
Third, in our quantum verification procedure, Alice and Bob have to disclose all their
measurement outcomes in a public channel. For each measured pair, there are four possible
outcomes, “↑↓”, “↓↑”, “↑↑” and “↓↓”, thus resulting in two bits of information. This is
more than the one-bit (0 or 1) parity information. Now, the question is Can Eve somehow
benefit from this additional information? The answer is “no” (this discussion is available
at www. sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl) [that is, Supplementary Note 5 in this
reprint version]. Finally, the issue of a quantum Trojan horse attack is addressed in (21).
This completes our proof of security of QKD.
Discussion. An important idea behind our quantum to classical reduction is that a
quantum mechanical experiment has a classical interpretation whenever observables that
refer to only one basis (the N -Bell basis in our case) are considered. The fine-grained
measurement operators by Alice and Bob along the three random bases do not commute
with the Bell-basis projection operators. However, Alice and Bob base their decision on
whether to accept the alleged singlets not on those fine-grained measurement results but
on the coarse-grained (parallel or antiparallel) ones. Those coarse-grained operators all
commute with a complete von Neumann measurement along the Bell basis (38).
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Our quantum to classical reduction technique is a powerful tool of widespread appli-
cations. It guarantees that one can apply standard results in the classical world (such as
probability theory and statistics theory) to the original quantum problem without leading
to fallacies. In effect, this means the extension of classical statistical theory to quantum
mechanics, resulting in a quantum statistical theory. To illustrate this point, we give two
other examples of applications of our quantum to classical reduction result . (i) Suppose two
distant observers share N pairs of qubits, and estimate the number of singlets in those N
pairs. By the number of singlets, we mean the expected number of “yes” answers if a singlet
or triplet measurement was made on each pair individually. (ii) Under the assumption that
signal carries are perfect single photons, put a probabilistic bound on an eavesdropper’s in-
formation in BB84 as a function of the error rates of the sampled photons. (These examples
are discussed at www. sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl.) [That is, Supplementary
Note 6 in this reprint version.]
The second example gives us a quantitative statement on the trade-off between infor-
mation gain and disturbance (39). This is a strong result to a notoriously difficult problem
because (i) the bound applies not merely to a strategy in which Eve couples a probe to each
signal particle but to any information extraction strategy that is consistent with quantum
mechanics and (ii) the bound can be derived by a random sampling of a small subset. In
other words, a concrete experimental random-sampling procedure (rather than an abstract
mathematical equation with little physical meaning) is presented here (40).
Finally, let us return to QKD itself. Although we have focused on the case when Alice
and Bob receive allegedly good EPR pairs from Eve, our proof of security of QKD also
applies to the case when Alice sends qubits (rather than halves of EPR pairs) to Bob.
Consider the following situation. Alice prepares N EPR pairs in her laboratory. She then
chooses the subsets for parity determination beforehand and performs all the computations
and measurements on her halves of the N EPR pairs in her own laboratory before sending
out the other halves to Bob. After Alice’s measurements, the subsystem that she sends to
Bob is in a pure state; that is, qubits rather than halves of EPR pairs are sent to Bob.
However, because Alice’s operation is local, it must commute with Eve’s eavesdropping
operator. Therefore, this qubit-based scheme must be as secure as the original EPR-based
scheme. (Just as in the EPR-based case, it is of the utmost importance for Alice to withhold
information on the choice of subsets for the parity determination until Bob acknowledges
the receipt of quantum transmission. Otherwise, Eve can cheat easily.)
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p1+2−m
is an increasing function of p1 have been used.
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FIG. 1. A sample one-way hashing protocol used to determine s1 ·x1 and s2 ·x2 for an unknown
three-Bell state. Following the convention of (18), Bx and By denote bilateral rotation of pi/2 along
the x and y axis, respectively; σx denotes a unilateral rotation of pi along the x axis; and the symbol
•—⊕ denotes a bilateral controlled NOT operation. M denotes a bilateral measurement.
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Appendix: Refereed Supplementary Materials
Supplementary Note 1:
The beamsplitter attack has been discussed by C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard,
L. Salvail, and J. Smolin in Ref. [12]. Here we show that, even in the case of zero bit error
rate (BER) in BB84, a generalized version of beamsplitter attack can break BB84 completely
provided that the loss due to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is sufficiently
large. For ease of discussion, we consider a generalized beamsplitter attack, which has been
brought to our attention by N. Lu¨tkenhaus. Eve measures the photon number observable N
of each pulse. If N is less than two, she keeps the signal herself and Bob receives nothing. If
N is two or larger, she uses an ideal beamsplitter to take one photon out. She then resends
the remaining photons to Bob via a superior channel so as to ensure that Bob still gets
the same bit rate. [This is possible provided that the loss of the quantum channel between
Alice and Bob is large enough.] Eve stores her photons and waits for the announcement of
the polarization bases. As far as polarization is concerned, Eve has an exact copy of Bob’s
signals. Therefore, by measuring her own photons along the correct bases in BB84, she
learns the polarizations of Bob’s received photons and hence the key.
Supplementary Note 2:
Lemma 1: (High fidelity implies low entropy) If 〈R singlets|ρ|R singlets〉 > 1 − δ where
δ ≪ 1, then the von Neumann entropy S(ρ) < −(1− δ) log2(1− δ)− δ log2 δ(22R−1) .
Proof: If 〈R singlets|ρ|R singlets〉 > 1− δ, then the largest eigenvalue of the density matrix
ρ must be larger than 1 − δ, the entropy of ρ is, therefore, bounded above by that of
ρ0 = diag {1− δ, δ(22R−1) , δ(22R−1) , · · · , δ(22R−1)}. That is, ρ0 is diagonal with a large entry 1− δ
and with the remaining probability δ equally distributed between the remaining 22R − 1
possibilities. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: (Entropy is a bound to mutual information.) Given any pure state φAB of a
system consisting of two subsystems A and B, and any generalized measurements X and Y
on A and B respectively, the entropy of each subsystem S(ρA) (where ρA = TrB|φAB〉〈φAB|)
is an upper bound to the amount of mutual information between X and Y .
Proof: This is a corollary to Holevo’s theorem (See A. S. Holevo, Probl. Inf. Transm. (USSR)
9, 117 (1973).) Q.E.D.
Supplementary Note 3:
For instance, one can simply choose a block code of length k (say k = 7) that can correct
a single error to encode a single qubit repeatedly. In the first level of this concatenated
coding scheme, the qubit is mapped into k qubits. In the second level of the coding, each of
the k qubits is individually encoded into k qubits, resulting in k2 qubits altogether, so on
and so forth. Let us assume that the errors for various elementary gates are independent and
of order ǫ. After the first level of encoding, all single errors can be corrected. Therefore, the
effective error rate is of the order ǫ2. More generally, the effective error rate of the (L+1)-th
level is related to that of the L-th level by ǫ(L+1) ∼ (ǫ(L))2. Consequently, one expects that
ǫ(L) ∼ ǫ0( ǫǫ0 )2
L
where ǫ0 is some threshold value of the error rate. (See Eq. (36) of Preskill
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in Ref. [25].) Therefore, the error rate becomes exponentially suppressed whenever a level
is added.
Supplementary Note 4:
On the contrary, if Eve were to know the subsets beforehand, then similar to our discus-
sion on classical random hashing, Eve could alway cheat successfully: In the above example,
suppose Eve is told beforehand the subsets s1 and s2 and that Alice and Bob will generate
their key by measuring their pair along z-axis. Then, Eve can cheat by finding out which
cheating final state will pass the verification test and then following its evolution backwards
in time to work out the initial state: Suppose Eve would like the value of the key to be “0”.
She observes that the final state |1˜0˜1˜1˜〉 ⊗ | ↑z↓z〉 = 1√2 |1˜0˜1˜1˜〉 ⊗ (|1˜1˜〉+ |0˜1˜〉) will achieve her
goal. Evolving it backwards in time, Eve finds that she needs to prepare the initial state
1√
2
|1˜1˜1˜1˜〉 ⊗ (|1˜1˜〉 − |0˜1˜〉).
Supplementary Note 5:
The key point to note is that, starting with an N -singlet state |1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉, the parity
computation will simply evolve it into another N -Bell state, up to a phase [18]. Notice that
the N pairs in such a final state are not entangled with one another. Therefore, if we consider
the untested N−m pairs, they should be in a pure state. In fact, they will be in an (N−m)-
Bell state, described by the density matrix, TrtestedUs1,s2,···,sm|1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉〈1˜1˜ · · · 1˜|U †s1,s2,···,sm.
Recall that, for any effective eavesdropping strategy (that is, one that passes the ver-
ification test with a probability ≥ 2−r), the fidelity of the initial state as N -singlets is
very close to 1. By unitarity, the fidelity of the final state as Us1,s2,···,sm|1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉 is also
close to 1. Since fidelity does not decrease under tracing [See R. Jozsa, J. Mod. Opt.
41, 2315 (1994) for this property.], the fidelity of the subsystem of the untested pairs as
TrtestedUs1,s2,···,sm|1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉〈1˜1˜ · · · 1˜|U †s1,s2,···,sm is very close to 1.
As TrtestedUs1,s2,···,sm|1˜1˜ · · · 1˜〉〈1˜1˜ · · · 1˜|U †s1,s2,···,sm is a pure state, we can apply the argu-
ment in note [28] to prove that the von Neumann entropy of those N −m untested pairs
is very close to 0 and, hence, that the mutual information between those N −m pairs and
the external universe (Eve plus tested pairs plus anything else) is exponentially small. Since
the tested pairs are just part of the external universe, measurements on them do not really
help.
Supplementary Note 6:
Here we give the key arguments for the reduction result in the two examples rigorously,
but leave out the irrelevant detailed calculations based on classical statistical theory. In the
first example, consider N pairs of qubits shared between Alice and Bob. Those pairs can
be entangled with each other and also with the external universe, for example, an ancilla
prepared by Eve. Suppose Alice and Bob would like to estimate the number of singlets. i.e.,
the expected number of “yes” answers if a singlet-or-not measurement were performed on
each pair individually. This number can, in principle, be determined by Bell measurements
if they bring the two halves together. However, Alice and Bob would like to perform local
measurements and classical communication only. We argue that they can, nonetheless,
estimate it accurately by the following method. They randomly pick m pairs and measure
the two members of each pair along an axis chosen randomly from x, y and z axes. Then
they publicly announce their outcomes.
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Claim: If k of the outcomes are anti-parallel, then the estimated fraction of singlets in
the N pairs is (3k −m)/2m. Furthermore, confidence levels can be deduced from classical
statistical theory.
Proof: Consider, for each pair, the projection operators P i‖ and P
i
anti−‖ for the two coarse-
grained outcomes (parallel and antiparallel) of the measurement performed on the ith pair. It
is straight-forward to express these projection operators as linear combinations of projection
operators along a single basis, namely, N -Bell basis. Let us consider the operatorMB which
represents the action of a measurement along N -Bell basis. Since MB, P
i
‖ and P
i
anti−‖ all
refer to a single basis (N -Bell basis), they clearly commute with each other. Thus, a pre-
measurement MB by Eve along N -Bell basis will in no way change the outcome for P
i
‖ and
P i‖. Therefore, we may as well consider the case when such a pre-measurement is performed
and the problem is classical to begin with.
Random sampling is a powerful technique in classical statistical theory. The Central
Limit Theorem shows that the asymptotic or large-sample distribution of the mean of a
random sample from any finite population with finite variance is normal. See, for example,
B. W. Lindgren, Statistical Theory (3rd. ed., Collier Macmillan, London, 1976). Therefore,
for a sufficiently large m, we can simply use a normal distribution to estimate the original
mean and establish the confidence level.
There is a minor subtlety. For each pair, only one of three random measurements is
performed. Since everything is now classical and is unrelated to the key points of this paper,
we shall skip the details here and refer the readers to, for example, W. G. Cochran, Sampling
Techniques (3rd ed.,Wiley, New York, 1977), chap. 5. Q.E.D.
This result is profound because it allows one to apply classical sampling theory and
central limit theorem to a quantum problem at hand.
For the second example, one can establish a rigorous probabilistic bound on the eaves-
dropper’s mutual information IEve on the final key by random sampling (i.e., by sampling
a random subset of photons, computing the error rates in the two bases and then applying
classical probability theory to estimate the real error rates, etc). We assume that the signal
carriers in BB84 are perfect single photons. Notice that Alice could use EPR pairs to pre-
pare photons in BB84. Let us consider a pre-measurement MB along N -Bell basis by Eve
and the coarse-grained projectors P i‖ and P
i
anti−‖. As before, they refer to a single basis and,
thus, commute with each other. Therefore, a pre-measurement MB will in no way change
those coarse-grained outcomes.
Alice and Bob pick m photons randomly from those that are both transmitted and
received along the same basis and publicly compare their polarizations. Alice and Bob can
then work out the “typical subspace” that is likely to give such error rates and compute its
dimensions. The logarithm of the number of dimensions of the typical subspace will be a very
good probabilistic bound on the eavesdropper’s information. [The probability amplitude on
the “atypical subspace” will also contribute to the entropy, but this contribution can be
made to be negligible in comparison. In more detail, Suppose there are N EPR pairs and
the squared amplitude on the atypical subspace is at most ǫ. Then the atypical space’s
contribution Sa to the entropy is no more than Sa = −ǫ log2 ǫ22N ≈ 2Nǫ. By making sure
that ǫ is much less than 1, Sa is much less than N . Since the contribution of the typical
space to the entropy is supposed to be linear in N in a noisy channel, clearly Sa is negligible
in comparison.]
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